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This empirical article deals with the location strategy and performance outcomes of franchised chains in Brazil. 
Brazilian franchising has experienced vertiginous process of expansion in recent years, being present in different 
regions of this country of continental size, including the most remote and less developed. Based on the background 
literature in economics and management regarding location choices and spatial competition in retailing, we use a 
new and unique dataset to distinguish several behavior categories in spatial strategies of franchising chains in 
Brazil, via a two-step cluster analysis. The performance outcomes are then studied with econometric estimations 
on panel data. Our results provide evidence that the choice for agglomeration, and the location in areas with a high 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This empirical article deals with the location strategy and performance outcomes of franchised 
chains in Brazil. Brazilian franchising has experienced vertiginous process of expansion in recent 
years, being present in different regions of this country of continental size, including the most 
remote and less developed. Based on the background literature in economics and management 
regarding location choices and spatial competition in retailing, we use a new and unique dataset 
to distinguish several behavior categories in spatial strategies of franchising chains in Brazil, via a 
two-step cluster analysis. The performance outcomes are then studied with econometric 
estimations on panel data. Our results provide evidence that the choice for agglomeration, and 
the location in areas with a high population and a high human development index, lead to higher 
chain performances. 
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“Brazil has a large expansion of franchising opportunity, beyond the capital and big cities. 
Brazil is a country of continental dimensions, with several pockets of development.” 
Cristina Franco  
Chair of the Brazilian Franchising Association (2015) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This empirical article studies the location strategy and performance outcome of franchised 
chains in Brazil.  
Brazilian franchising has experienced vertiginous process of expansion in recent years, being 
present in different regions of the country, including the most remote and less developed. 
At the moment, Brazil is going through an important economic and political crisis. For 2014, 
the most optimistic projections attribute growth of less than one digit to the national gross 
domestic product. As a reflection of this low economic performance, the Brazilian retail sector 
showed modest growth of 2.2% in 2014. However, franchising in Brazil continues to grow. Thus, 
according to the Brazilian Franchising Association (ABF), the total income of Brazilian 
franchising in 2014 grew 7.7% compared to 2013. This growth continued in 2015. Indeed, during 
the first half of 2015, the income increased 11.2% compared to the same period in 2014, while 
only for the 2nd quarter of 2015, the income growth was estimated at 13.1% (ABF, 2015). 
Despite the current economic crisis, Brazil stands as one of the main emerging economies for 
the 21st century, and is part of the BRICS, in addition with Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. One main feature regrouping these emerging countries is their continental dimension, 
specifically for Brazil, Russia, India and China, which raises the issue of spatial inequalities and 
agglomeration phenomena in the economic development (Fally et al., 2010; Lessmann, 2014; 
Cheong & Wu, 2014). Thus, more than elsewhere, the geographical dimension is a critical point 
in this context and, at the microeconomic level, location choices are key strategical elements for 
the economic actors. 
Regarding Brazilian franchising, the Southeast accounted for 58.8% in the spatial allocation of 
franchised units during the first half of 2015, followed by the South (14.9%), as presented in 
Appendix 1. These regions are the richest of the country. However, other regions have attracted 
the attention for network expansion. The Northeast is a special case, accounting for 14.1% of 
franchised units in Brazil in 2015, while it was estimated at around 2% in 2013/2014 (ABF, 
2015). Central West and North, in turn, represent respectively 8% and 4.2% in 2015.  
However, while franchising issues in the BRICS economies is a major field of interest at the 
moment (Dant & Grünhagen, 2014), and despite several interesting articles dealing more 
specifically with Brazilian franchising (Azevedo & Silva, 2005; Dant et al. 2008; Falbe & Welsh, 
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1998; Lafontaine & Oxley, 2004; Silva et al. 2009; Streed & Cliquet, 2013; Vance et al. 2011; 
Fadairo & Lanchimba, 2013; Michael, 2014; Resende Melo, 2015), the locational aspects of 
franchising in Brazil remains mainly unexplored - the only exception being an article by Bitti et al. 
(2010) -, and represents a gap in the literature.  
In the retailing literature, location is clearly, and for a long time, considered as a major 
determinant of firm performance (Jones & Simmons 1987), and as one of the most critical factor 
of performance in the case of retail networks (Cliquet, 1998). Thus, in their central articles in the 
retail location literature, Applebaum (1966) and Cliquet (1998) define the key concepts of store 
trade areas, market penetration, and potential sales (Applebaum, 1966), in addition with the 
important concept of entropy, measuring the territory coverage of a retail network (Cliquet, 1998; 
Streed & Cliquet, 2013). 
However, as underlined by Ehrmann & Meiseberg (2011), locational strategy for network 
expansion has received little attention in the franchise literature. When addressed, the geographic 
dimension is most often taken into account as a way to evaluate the monitoring costs between 
headquarters and the outlets of franchise chains  (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Minkler, 
1990; Maness, 1996; Bitti & al, 2010; Combs and Ketchen, 2003; Perryman & Combs 2012). 
Considering these gaps in the literature, and based on previous researches in economics and 
strategic management, this paper addresses the following issue: in the Brazilian case of franchised 
networks, is it possible to highlight different profiles of location choices, and to distinguish the 
most efficient location strategies?  
To characterize the different profiles of networks, we use the concept of behavior categories, 
referring to Porter (1980)’s strategic groups, defined as sets of firms in an industry that display 
similar competitive profiles, and to Meyer et al. (1993)’s configurations, relating to groups of 
firms with a common organizational profile. Behavior categories in the locational strategy of 
franchising networks in Brazil are distinguished by means of a two-step cluster analysis. We use a 
unique and recent panel dataset enclosing interesting information in terms of geographical 
location. The study variables for the empirical analysis are derived from the literature relating 
retailing and location choices. Finally, we perform econometric estimations, and relate behavior 
categories in location choices to network performance outcomes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background literature, and identifies 
relevant choices determining the locational strategy of multi-outlet chains. Section 3 describes the 
data, providing information on the data collection and the study variables, in addition with 
summary statistics. The cluster analysis and the estimations are respectively presented in Section 4 
and Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related research  
 
In view of the objective to investigate behavior categories in Brazilian franchising, this article 
is related to the clustering tradition of networks in the franchise literature. Several important 
contributions can be mentioned, Carney & Gedajlovic (1991), Combs & Ketchen (1999), Combs 
et al. (2004), Gonzalez-Diaz & Solis-Rodriguez (2015), which relate specific strategies 
characterizing groups of franchise chains with performance outcomes. As mentioned by Combs 
and Ketchen (1999), the clusters can be derived inductively or theoretically. We give priority to 
the second case, where the variables used for the clustering process are related to theoretical 
results. We present hereafter the theoretical background of our analysis. 
Given the importance of location choices, previously emphasized, a vast literature dealing with 
consumer spatial behavior and retail location exists. The aim of this analytical section is not to 
review this wide research field, but to highlight the theoretical results, in economics and 
management, relevant to distinguish behavior categories in the location strategy of franchised 
chains in Brazil. This strategy relates to the choice of where to locate retail outlets. From the 
background literature, four main determinants of the geographical location strategy of franchised 
networks can be distinguished. We discuss them in the following.  
 
2.1. The choice for agglomeration versus  dispersion 
 
Spatial competition, where customer behaviors are influenced by the cost of transportation 
and the relative locations of purchaser and purveyor, can give rise to a variety of retail location 
patterns. Agglomeration of retail outlets is one of the most relevant. Indeed, contrary to the 
aspatial competition of standard microeconomics models, spatial competition has monopolistic 
features leading to agglomeration. Space introduces monopolistic elements, as in spatial markets 
all firms enjoy some degree of monopoly power over their immediate market area. 
In this analytical context, Hoteling (1929)’s pioneering contribution formally demonstrates the 
benefits of clustering. Hoteling’s model shows that in a duopoly of maximizing firms selling 
identical products from fixed locations, in a bounded linear market, firms cluster at the center of 
the market area, guaranteeing themselves one-half share of the market. The modeled 
noncollusive duopolistic competition results in price stability, and is characterized by the 
principle of minimum differentiation regarding locational decisions. 
This demonstration can be extended to several types of locations, not only spatial, for example 
location in terms of product differences. Still, Hoteling’s analysis stands as the main normative 
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theory of retail location, and the principle of minimum differentiation as the most relevant 
explanation of the agglomeration of similar retail firms. 
However, in addition to the benefits of clustering, the risk of cannibalization must be taken 
into account (Pancras et al. 2012), since we focus on the location choices of retail outlets within 
the same chain. Cannibalization relates to spatial competition between geographically proximate 
retail outlets, when the presence of a new unit captures sales of other outlets. The spatial strategy 
of franchising chains, depending on the choice of where to locate their retail units, is affected by 
this cannibalization effect. This intra-chain competition effect may thus influence the spatial 
choices in the way of dispersion versus agglomeration. 
Pancras et al. (2012) estimate this cannibalization effect and provide evidence for a significant 
decay in cannibalization with distance. In a context of network expansion, they measure the net 
impact of a new store opening on the overall chain performance. This impact results from the 
joint and contradictory effect of incremental sales versus cannibalization. Estimating via 
econometrics and panel data the parameters of a demand model that captures spatial 
competition, they highlight a clear empirical link between cannibalization and distance.  
With the concept of entropy, Cliquet (1998) defines a tool to measure the territory of 
geographic coverage of a retail chain. If a population of stores is concentrated in one spatial area, 
entropy is minimum. It is maximum with dispersion. 
While the choice for agglomeration versus dispersion concerns the density of retail outlets, 
spatial strategies also deal with site selection decision, in other words with the choice to locate 
stores in a specific region or city. 
 
2.2. The choice for a specific region or city 
 
With the nearest center hypothesis postulated by the classical central place theory (Christaller, 
1933; Losch, 1954), customers necessarily shop at the closest store. Gravity models underline also 
the importance of geographical distance, but demonstrate that the attractiveness of a retailing 
location, and therefore the choice to locate in a specific place, is not exclusively related to it. 
These models include thus a variety of other factors in the attraction concept. 
Gravity models are derived from the laws of Newtonian physics.  In this literature, Reilly 
(1931), Huff (1964) and Huff & Batsell (1977) played a pioneering role. Reilly’s law of retail 
gravitation states that consumers trade off the cost of travel to a retail outlet with the 
attractiveness of alternative shopping opportunities. 
More generally, gravitational models allow to study attractiveness phenomena and spatial 
interactions, considering other attributes in addition to distance related to the potential of a local 
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or regional area, as demographic weight, gross domestic product, or socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
These models suggest thus that there are differences in location quality. As emphasized by 
Ehrmann & Meiseberg (2011), this is the case with the whole location theory (Ghosh & 
McLafferty 1982; Lee & McCracken 1982; Craig et al., 1984; Ghosh & McLafferty, 1987; Jones & 
Simmons, 1990; Simons 1992; Kelly et al., 1993; Peterson 2003; Christensen & Drejer, 2005; Park 
& Khan, 2006; Khan 1999; Park & Khan 2006). 
Recognizing that some places are more lucrative, or have a greater potential to be profitable, 
than others, Ehrmann & Meiseberg (2011) study the location decisions in the expansion of 
franchising networks. These authors show that, in addition with endogenous network 
characteristics, exogenous location factors related to market perspective criteria, as population 
density or local income, affect location decisions. 
 
2.3. Additional determinants of the location strategy 
 
 
2.3.1. First mover advantage versus new entrant advantage 
 
The timing is also part of spatial strategies. Indeed, the first firm to locate in a market can 
capture strategic sites. This first mover advantage acts thus as a barrier to entry and delays the 
entry of new competitors by affecting their locational choices. 
Distinguishing competitive advantages at several stages of a franchise life (Lillis et al., 1976), 
and studying territorial expansion of franchised chains in geographically fragmented markets 
(Julian & Castrogiovanni 1995), Lillis et al. (1976) and Julian & Castrogiovanni (1995) develop the 
idea that when franchisors attempt to capitalize on the first mover advantage by preempting the 
most desirable locations and saturating the market, locations are dispersed. 
In addition, the empirical findings of Carney & Gedajlovic (1991) highlight the heterogeneity 
of strategies in franchising chains. These authors argue that the need for spatial preemption, and 
the accompanying rapid growth, is particularly important when franchisors have innovative retail 
concepts. 
Finally, considering the short- and long-run incentives to franchise, and monitoring problems 
related to geographic dispersion, Martin & Justis (1993) explain the intensive use of franchising in 
the early growth stages, arguing that growth and preemptive strategies are most important for 
young franchisors.  
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However, the alternative strategy can be interesting too. Later entrants may have an advantage 
since they are better able to react to changing conditions 
 
 
2.3.2.  Location choices and network ownership structure  
 
As previously mentioned, in the franchise literature, the location issue is most often taken into 
account within the agency theory framework and the related monitoring cost problem. 
Since the pioneering contributions of Rey & Tirole (1986a, 1986b), Mathewson & Winter 
(1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1985), agency theory, focusing on the delegation of tasks, is the main 
theoretical context to study franchising. The literature highlights free-riding behaviors in retail 
networks, and underlines the deriving need for the headquarters to monitor the outlets  (Brickley 
& Dark 1987; Lafontaine & Slade 2001; Lal 1990; Michael 1999). 
Network expansion and spatial dispersion increase the monitoring agency problem. In other 
words, with the geographical dispersion of the network, the costs of monitoring managers and 
enforcing quality standards increase. Monitoring outlets in geographic markets that are far from 
headquarters is more costly, due to the number of monitoring personnel required and to the 
related travel expenses (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991). 
Because they are independent firms, franchisees are more likely to provide efforts, requiring 
thus less monitoring. This situation would impact the ownership structure of retail networks, 
mixing strategically company-owned units and franchised units as part of their location strategy. 
This argument finds empirical support in the econometric work on franchise data. 
Indeed, as emphasized by Perryman and Combs (2012), the most common test of the 
monitoring cost prediction in the framework of the agency theory investigates the relationship 
between the geographic dispersion of a chain and its ownership composition, that is the 
proportion of franchised outlets or, on the reverse, the proportion of company-owned outlets. 
Brickley & Dark (1987), Norton (1988), Lafontaine (1992), Maness (1996), Combs and 
Ketchen (2003), Combs and Ketchen (2003), Bitti et al. (2010), provide evidence that outlets 
located close to headquarters are more likely to be company owned, while retail units in more 
distant locations are more likely to be franchised. Moreover, monitoring costs arising from the 
geographical dispersion of the chain would be sufficient to explain the franchise option. More 
generally, at the chain level, the higher the geographical dispersion, and thus the related 
monitoring cost, the lower the proportion of company-owned outlets. 
Therefore, a clear link is established between spatial strategies of franchising networks and the 
chain ownership structure.  
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3. The Data  
 
We use recent panel data for the period 2009-2014, regarding 335 franchise networks. The 
sample franchise chains occupy 1,397 Brazilian municipalities, and are present in the 26 Brazilian 
states. 
Our unique dataset compiles information from three main distinct sources: the ABF’s Official 
Franchise Guides, the websites of franchise chains, and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE). 
We present hereafter the data collection process, and then the study variables derived from 
the analytical framework. We discuss the relevance of the sample, comparing with the full 
population. Finally we provide summary statistics.  
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
Our first source is the ABF’s Official Franchise Guide. This annual publication provides 
valuable information on the Brazilian franchise sector. More precisely, the guide contains data 
concerning chain characteristics, as the franchise fee, the total number of outlets, the required 
investment level of the franchisees, the number of employees, and so on. We obtained data for 
the period 2009-2014. 
In order to achieve a better understanding of how the ABF collected the information used to 
construct our dataset, we performed interviews with executives from this organization. 
Specifically, we performed interviews with the President of the ABF, his executive director, and 
his marketing analyst, who is responsible for both collecting and pooling information provided 
by the franchised networks. 
The ABF has an internal information system accessible to associated franchised chains, which 
are free to update information regarding their network in real time. The chains have an interest in 
keeping up-to-date information, since the Guide is an important communication channel with 
potential franchisees. Divergent or even fake information could damage the reputation of the 
chain, or make the search for potential franchisees mode difficult. Therefore, there is a strong 
incentive for franchising networks to offer good quality information. 
In addition, the ABF controls for the consistency of the data, analyzing systematically the 
annual variations before publishing official information. Any anormal variation is checked and 
corrected. 
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However, the ABF does not already have a scientific advising council. For this reason, the 
ABF marketing department performs both the monitoring and the validation of provided data. If 
necessary, specialized consultants are hired for more specific studies. 
The websites of the sample franchise networks are our second main source of information. 
The manual capturing of website data was used to perform control checks, and to complete the 
missing values from the ABF guides. In addition, we used this data source to collect spatial 
information regarding the Zip codes of cities were the franchised chains are established, in 
addition with the proportion of network outlets operated in shopping malls. When the network 
websites were incomplete, we used the PEGN publication, which is a SME specialized Brazilian 
media. 
As our analysis requires localized data, we use a third source of information, the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We collected information about georeferencing 
(longitude and latitude) of the municipalities where franchising networks are established, the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the population, and the Human Development Index (HDI).  
The IBGE information comes from censuses conducted in 1991, 2000 and 2010. 
Municipalities HDI data are also available in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
website for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
We pooled the different sources of information, performed crosschecks, and matched the data 
in order to stabilize the final sample enclosing the required information for our empirical analysis.  
Finally, as all the Brazilian chains are not associated to the ABF, we controlled for the bias in 
our sample compared to the franchise network population in Brazil. To do so, we performed an 
initial analysis with some Brazilian franchising consolidated information available on the ABF 
website. Table 1 presents the 11 segments of the franchising industry in Brazil, based on the ABF 
taxonomy. For each segment, we tabulated data regarding the total income of the segment, the 
number of chains and the number of outlets (company-owned and franchised) in 2014. It is thus 
possible to compare the franchising sector in Brazil as a whole, to both the whole “ABF chains” 
and our final sample. Table 1 presents the absolute values and the ratios for each sector in 
comparison to the total for each of the three variables used in the bias analysis1. 
Two segments appear over-represented in our sample (as in ABF as a whole): Food and Shoes 
& Accessories. This over-representation occurs for the three variables. The proportion of chains 
in these segments is between ABF associated chains compared to the Brazilian franchising sector 
                                                
1  To calculate the total sales (income) of the networks associated to the ABF (and therefore of the sample chains), we 
computed the average income per store, which is multiplied by the total number of stores. We treated the missing 
values using the average value for each segment.  
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as a whole; and it is greater in the sample compared to ABF. This is also the case for the total 
income and for the total number of outlets. Conversely, segments of House & Building and 
Business, Services & Other Retails appear underrepresented. The sample contains 11.3% of all 
chains operating in Brazil, 26.6% of the outlets. The sample networks represent 31.2% of all 
sector incomes. 
In summary, data indicate a bias in the sample relative to the population: the sample networks 
are typically larger, and the sector representation does not reflect exactly the population. For this 
reason, some dose of parsimony should be included when analyzing the results. 
However, we insist on the good quality of the data, compiling three different and 
complementary sources of information. Our unique sample consists of a six-year panel, in a wide 
range of activities, and contains geographical information. The aforementioned bias regarding 
some specific segments calls for the use of sector dummies in the econometric estimations in 
order to control it.   
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Table 1 – Bias Analysis – Comparison between the Brazilian franchising sector, ABF associated chains, and the sample (source: ABF 2014) 
Segments 
ABF Classification 
Total Income (R$ million) 
Total Number of Total Number of 
Outlets Chains 
Sector ABF Sample Sector ABF Sample Sector ABF Sample 
R$ % R$ % R$ % Un. % Un. % Un. % Chains % Chains % Chains % 
Shoes & Accessories 8.847 6,9 7.247 8,8 5.982 14,9 8.285 6,6 6.390 8,1 4.787 14,3 216 7,3 92 9,8 39 11,6 
Food 25.635 19,9 22.472 27,3 18.562 46,2 21.720 17,3 19.394 24,6 11.085 33,2 685 23,3 258 27,4 119 35,5 
House & Building 7.320 5,7 4.489 5,5 701 1,7 5.380 4,3 4.262 5,4 424 1,3 159 5,4 69 7,3 4 1,2 
Advertising, Informatics & Electronics 3.867 3 525 0,6 230 0,6 3.336 2,7 1.049 1,3 207 0,6 142 4,8 34 3,6 4 1,2 
Education 8.538 6,6 6.885 8,4 4.264 10,6 14.732 11,7 10.714 13,6 7.307 21,9 298 10,1 98 10,4 44 13,1 
Sports, Health, Beauty & Leisure 23.288 18,1 11.436 13,9 4.581 11,4 20.670 16,5 11.928 15,1 4.956 14,8 547 18,6 136 14,4 54 16,1 
Hoteling & Tourism 9.329 7,2 3.483 4,2 1.023 2,5 2.674 2,1 791 1 160 0,5 49 1,7 14 1,5 3 0,9 
Cleaning 1.159 0,9 1.403 1,7 382 0,9 3.426 2,7 2.586 3,3 800 2,4 97 3,3 32 3,4 5 1,5 
Business, Services & Other Retails 26.726 20,7 15.332 18,6 828 2,1 28.616 22,8 5.041 6,4 1.015 3 305 10,4 87 9,2 22 6,6 
Cars 4.490 3,5 3.872 4,7 1.244 3,1 8.032 6,4 12.733 16,2 648 1,9 115 3,9 29 3,1 4 1,2 
Clothes 9.677 7,5 5.115 6,2 2.369 5,9 8.770 7 3.939 5 1.998 6 329 11,2 94 10 37 11 
TOTAL 128.876   82.259   40.166   125.641   78.827   33.387   2.942   943   335   
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3.2. Measurement 
 
We present hereafter the study variables, used in the empirical estimations, and in the cluster 
analysis determining behavior categories in spatial strategies of franchising chains in Brazil. 
The variables for the cluster analysis are based on the background literature regarding location 
choices in franchising or, more broadly in retailing. In line with our analytical framework, these 
variables are the following: the network geographic dispersion, the percentage of network outlets 
located in shopping malls, the weighted average human development index of the network 
location area, and the weighted average population of the network location area. In addition with 
these localized variables, we include complementary variables related to the location strategy: the 
network age, the percentage of company-owned units, and the chain brand value.  
In the econometric estimations, the dependent variable is the average monthly income per 
outlet.  The core explanatory variable is the network location strategy constructed via the cluster 
analysis. We add variables to control for the influence of the sector, of the headquarter 
nationality, and of the ABF certification of excellence. 
More details are provided in the following.  
 
3.2.1. Variables defining the chain location strategy (Cluster Analysis) 
 
3.2.1.1. Location variables 
 
Network Geographic Dispersion 
 
 
The construction of this variable is based on the geographic location of the network outlets. 
First, we surveyed the addresses of all the sample network outlets in 2011 and 2014. We created 
thus two specific data sets containing information regarding the Brazilian municipalities where 
the franchising chains are established. Then, we georeferenced the cities where the stores are 
located, getting their latitude and their longitude. 
On this basis, we constructed geographic clusters for each network regrouping stores located 
in the same area. Each cluster is thus an area of agglomeration of network outlets. We defined 
the center for each cluster so that the cumulative distance between the stores and the cluster 
center is the smallest possible1.  
The distance criterion is the Euclidean distance based on the latitude and the longitude of the 
cities where each store is located. For example, assuming that a store A is located in the point (xA, 
                                                
1 To split the data and to determine the appropriate number of clusters for each chain, we used the “R” package 
“NbClust” and the “Kmeans” R function. 
 
 
14 
yA) and a store B is located in the point (xB, yB), the Euclidean distance between them is defined as 
follows: 
 !(#, %) 	= 	 (()*	-	),)- 	+	(/*-/,)-)   
 
 
Our variable, the network geographic dispersion, is measured as the distance between the 
stores in the clusters, to which we add the distance between the centers of the chain clusters. 
 
Percentage of network outlets located in shopping malls  
 
Jointly with the outlet addresses, we also captured whether the store is located in some kind of 
shopping mall. Thus, for each chain in our sample, we are able to define the proportion of outlets 
located in shopping centers, in a percentage base. 
 
 
Weighted average HDI of the network location areas  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a socio-economic indicator developed by the Units 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the early 90’s to measure both the countries 
socioeconomic development of countries and their constituent units (states, provinces, 
municipalities, etc.).  
This multidimensional indicator aims at going beyond the only economic issue, and captures, 
in addition with economic features, some aspects related to public health and education. 
Moreover, given its synthetic character, the index allows establishing a ranking and, as a result, 
certain comparability between countries and regions. More precisely, the HDI compiles three 
indexes relating to three distinct socioeconomic dimensions: 
• Longevity – which measures life expectancy at birth and also reflects the health of the 
population; 
• Education – an index operationalized by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the 
combined enrollment rate in primary, secondary and higher education;  
• Income – a measure of population's purchasing power based on GDP per capita adjusted 
to the local cost of living to make it comparable across countries and regions, through the 
methodology known as purchasing power parity. 
 
The IBGE provides information regarding the HDI for each Brazilian state and municipality. 
Since its inception in the early 90’s, the HDI has been recorded three times (1990, 2000 and 
2010). In our study, we use the index calculated by the UNDP in 2010.  
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Our study variable is the weighted average HDI of cities where the network is established. We 
use as weight the number of stores per town. 
 
Weighted average population of the network location areas 
 
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), implements for the Brazilian 
government a population census approximately every 10 years, with the last three censuses 
conducted in 1991, 2000 and 2010. Out of this period, the IBGE estimates the population per 
municipality by linearizing the trend indicated by the last two censuses. We used the IBGE 
estimates for 2011 regarding the population of the cities were the sample chains were established, 
in 2011 to calculate the weighted average, using the same procedure as with the HDI.  
 
3.2.1.2 Additional variables related to the location strategy 
 
Network age 
 
The age of the network is the difference between the year of the first franchised unit and each 
year in our panel. 
 
Percentage of company owned-units 
 
This variable represents for each franchising chain the proportion of company-owned units in 
the total of the chain outlets. 
 
Brand value 
 
The ABF yearbooks provide information about a total of thirteen types of supports that the 
associated franchisors offer to their franchisees. Parts of them are obligatory, as defined by the 
Brazilian Law of Franchising (No. 8955/94). The other supports are optional. They are: legal 
support, choice of plant and equipment, support for financing leverage, promotional support, 
financing of project, marketing project, organizational design, design/production layout of the 
new store, and advertising and marketing.  
In our dataset, all these types of supports are represented by a dummy variable. We add these 
dummies to construct a proxy of the brand value, related to the franchisor’s effort. 
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3.2.2. Variables used to study the performance outcome (Econometric estimations) 
 
3.2.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
Network average monthly income per outlet 
 
The performance indicator is the dependent variable of our econometric models. We used the 
network average monthly income per outlet. This information is available in the ABF Franchising 
Guide. We collected the information from 2009 to 2014.  
 
3.2.2.2. Core explanatory variable 
 
Location strategy 
 
The network location strategy is the main explanatory variable of our econometric models. We 
constructed this variable with a two-step cluster analysis (section 4), using the variables previously 
presented (subsection 3.2.1.). 
 
3.2.2.3. Control variables 
 
Sector dummies 
 
The ABF Guide offers a sector classification. We made the choice to use this official 
classification of the franchising chains in Brazil to construct sector dummies. The classification is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Foreign  
 
We constructed an additional dummy variable to indicate whether chains operating in Brazil 
have a Brazilian or a foreign headquarter. 
 
ABF label “certification of excellence” 
 
The ABF Seal of Excellence is awarded to distinguish chains achieving a minimum level of 
satisfaction among its franchisees. This certification is based on a survey of the franchisees, 
conducted by the ABF. The results are published annually in the Franchising Guide. 
Franchising chains that reached the specified satisfaction ratings are identified with the label. 
It is important to mention that chains have to pay to be part of the contest. Franchisees 
satisfaction indexes include the overall chain performance (the franchisor quality in coordinating 
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the whole chain), the brand performance with regard to profitability, and operating performance 
of the chain (class support to franchisees). 
We used a dummy variable to indicate the chain situation during the period 2009-2014. 
 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
 
 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviation, and correlation matrix. Because the presence of 
a few missing values may bias the estimations, we completed the data with the average values. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that the variables are quite homogenous in the sample, as shown 
by the means higher than the standard deviations. However, this is not the case with the variables 
dispersion and percentage of company-owned units, characterized by some degree of heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics and correlations 
 
 Average SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Location Strategy 
 
2.43 0.62 1 ,000** .012 ,000** .000 ,000** .033 ,000** .042 .025 
2. Network Dispersion 0.40 2.49   ,000** 1 -,080** ,000** -,100** -,083** -,061** -,096** -,053* -.042 
3. % of network outlets in 
Shopping Malls 
 
0.42 0.39 .012 -,080** 1 -.039 ,089** -,052* ,000** ,000** ,000** ,000** 
4. Network Age 
 
21.66 15.09 ,000** ,000** -.039 1 -.016 -,046* .006 -,050* -.003 ,000** 
5. % of Company-Owned 
Units 0.21 0.25 .000 -,100** ,089** -.016 1 ,000** ,000** ,044* ,095** ,000** 
6. Brand value 10.78 2.36 ,000** -,083** -,052* -,046* ,000** 1 .024 ,065** ,052* .005 
7. Mean Population of the 
network location area 
 
3.29 2.32 .033 -,061** ,000** .006 ,000** .024 1 ,000** ,000** ,000** 
8. Mean HDI of the 
network location area 
 
0.78 0.01 ,000** -,096** ,000** -,050* ,044* ,065** ,000** 1 ,000** ,082** 
9. Mean GDP of the 
network location area 
 
125.01 98.84 .042 ,053* ,000** -.003 ,095** ,052* ,000** ,000** 1 ,100** 
10. Performance 84.76 76.79 .025 -.042 ,000** ,000** ,000** .005 ,000** ,082** ,100** 1 
 
* Three variables have a higher scale than the others, and are thus divided by 1000 000: Network Dispersion, Mean GDP of the 
network location area, Mean Population of the network location area. 
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4. Behavior categories in spatial strategies 
 
4.1. Methodology  
 
In order to construct the variable location strategy, that will be the core explanatory variable in 
the estimations, we use a two-step cluster analysis. This statistical multivariate technique is indeed 
developed in two phases. The aim is to achieve the maximum intra-group homogeneity and the 
biggest inter-group heterogeneity that would otherwise not be apparent. 
To carry out this analysis, in the first stage, the individuals are distributed into pre-clusters, 
which become single individuals in the second stage. This second stage consists in applying a 
hierarchical algorithm in the pre-clusters. The advantage of this method is that categorical and 
continuous variables can be included. In addition, the number of clusters is automatically selected 
and the method allows controlling for the quality of the clustering process. 
As previously mentioned, our analysis is based the following variables: the network geographic 
dispersion, the percentage of network outlets located in shopping malls, the weighted average 
human development index of the network location area, and the weighted average population of 
the network location area. In addition with these localized variables, we include complementary 
variables related to the location strategy: the network age, the percentage of company-owned 
units, and the chain brand value. 
As we use a panel dataset, we consider here each franchised network for a specific year as a 
different individual the other years. This methodology enables to capture changes in strategy over 
time. 
Finally, we use the variable network geographic dispersion as criterion to order the clusters, and to 
construct on this basis the ordered qualitative variable location strategy. 
We perform two additional cluster analyses i.e. two additional ways to construct the variable 
location strategy, for robustness checks in the econometric estimations. All the clustering processes 
present a good quality level, as shown in Appendix 2. 
 
4.2. Data analysis and features of the three behavior categories 
 
The first and main clustering process allows us to distinguish three groups of franchising 
networks in Brazil. On the basis of descriptive statistics for each group2, the following comments 
can be offered to specify the three behavior categories. 
 
                                                
2 The whole descriptive statistics are available upon request. 
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The first group that we label "concentrated beginners franchisors" contains the youngest networks 
(15.9 years), with a low geographic dispersion. These chains are established in cities with a 
moderate population and HDI. The franchisors in this group have established franchised units 
almost immediately. These networks are also characterized by a moderate presence in shopping 
malls. Regarding the contract design, the royalty rate and the upfront fee of these chains are 
smaller in average compared to the two other groups.  
We label the second group "concentrated mature franchisors". This second category consists of 
older networks (27.1 years), with a moderate geographic dispersion. This group is distinguished 
by a positive and significant relationship between the HDI and the total number of units; the 
units are located in cities with a high population. In addition, the networks are mainly present in 
shopping malls. In this group, the presence in shopping malls is positively and significantly 
related to the royalty rate. The reason of this correlation could be the strong brand name value, 
compared to the other two groups. 
The third group is labeled "dispersed mature franchisors". The networks in this group have a high 
level of geographic dispersion, and they are the oldest (29.78 years) in average in the sample. The 
age is positively and significantly related to the number of cities where the network is established. 
In addition, the number of cities where the network is established is significantly and negatively 
related to the percentage of company-owned units. This correlation is clearly higher compared to 
the other two groups. This seems to indicate that the expansion process experienced by these 
chains is strongly driven by franchising. 
 
From this analysis, two main discriminating variables are highlighted: the network geographic 
dispersion and the network age. As previously mentioned, we make the choice to order the 
ordered qualitative variable location strategy, constructed with the two-step cluster analysis, using 
the network geographic dispersion. This variable is the main regressor in our econometric 
models, as presented hereafter. 
 
5. Performance outcome of spatial strategies 
 
5.1. Methodology 
 
 
Regarding the choice of the econometric model, as we use panel data, we compare first the 
random effects model and the fixed effects model. Both of them address the problem of the 
unobserved heterogeneity by specifying an error term constant over time for each unit (fixed 
effects model) or randomly distributed over time for each unit (random effects model). 
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With short periods panels, as with the sample, the random effects model may produce better 
estimators than the fixed effects model (Heckman, 1981). In addition, the random effects model 
is consistent in the presence of time-invariant variables (Greene, 2000). This is not the case of the 
fixed effects model. Indeed, time-invariant variables can be perfectly collinear with the fixed 
effects, while most of the contract variables are by nature almost time-invariant. 
The Hausman test confirms our intuition, and shows that the random effects model is more 
appropriate to the data (χ2: 1.44, p-value: 0.487) 
Additional checks are performed, which confirm the choice for the random effects model.  
We use the Lagrange multiplier test to see if the variance across the franchised networks is zero. 
This test supports the random effect model, since it provides evidence of significant differences 
across the networks (χ2: 3228.64, p-value: 0.000). 
Using again the Hausman test, we check for potential problems of endogeneity, since the 
regressors may indeed raise endogeneity problems, because they are geographical characteristics 
from where the outlet is located deriving from the franchisor's choice. We compare an 
instrumental model including as instrument the lagged variable, with the previous results. The 
results presented in Appendix 4 show that there is no problem of endogeneity. 
In addition, we perform a likelihood-ratio test regarding heteroskedasticity at the panel level. 
The results (χ2: 3307.8, p-value: 0.000) confirm that the data in the sample do not have a 
common disturbance variance, providing thus another support for the random effect model. We 
also test for autocorrelation. The results (χ2: 13.23, p-value: 0.000) show that we have to correct 
this problem. 
In order to correct these different problems we use the generalized least squares method 
(GLS). This method enables us to estimate the unknown parameters of a linear regression model. 
The GLS is applied when the variances of the observations are unequal (heteroscedasticity 
problem), or/and when there is a certain degree of correlation between the observations. It is 
well known that in both cases the ordinary least squares (OLS) can be statistically inefficient, or 
even provide misleading inferences. 
Finally, we test if all year coefficients are not jointly equal to zero. The results (χ2: 215.11, p-
value: 0.000) show that the time-fixed effects are needed. 
All the results of the specification tests are presented in Appendix 4.  
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5.2. Estimation results  
 
 
Our estimation results are reported in Table 3, and concern the influence of the location 
strategy on franchised chain performances  (models 1 and 2). 
For robustness checks, we perform estimations with alternative construct of the location 
strategy3 (models 3-6).  
 
 
Table 2 – Performance outcome of spatial strategies (1) 
 
Random-effects models for the average monthly income per outlet 
 
 
 (1) 
(3 clusters) 
(2) 
(3 clusters) 
(3) 
(7 clusters) 
(4) 
(7 clusters) 
(5) 
(9 clusters) 
 
(6) 
(9 clusters) 
       
Location Strategy  -1.839* -3.304*** -1.840*** -0.572* -1.173*** -0.724*** 
 (1.011) (0.840) (0.304) (0.298) (0.205) (0.205) 
       
Foreign  -26.71***  -26.83***  -25.92*** 
  (3.718)  (3.980)  (3.927) 
       
ABF label  1.547**  1.559**  1.664** 
  (0.704)  (0.701)  (0.709) 
       
Sector dummies no 
 
yes no yes no yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Constant 77.70*** 92.38*** 80.22*** 84.99*** 79.66*** 86.20*** 
 (2.645) (2.439) (1.232) (1.145) (1.165) (1.186) 
       
N 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wald chi2 124.62*** 883.62*** 191.77*** 954.71*** 188.93*** 950.88*** 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 
We comment first the good global significance of the models, highlighted by the Wald Chi2 
tests. In addition, comparing the estimations of the models based on three, seven and nine 
clusters, the models including or not sector dummies, and the models including or not control 
variables, we conclude that the results are robust.  
The main result of this set of estimations is the clear significant influence of the location 
strategy on the network performance. As clusters are ranked regarding the dispersion variable, the 
negative sign means that higher network geographic dispersion generates a lower performance. In 
other words, agglomeration would favor chain performance. 
                                                
3  Cluster  analyses  with  seven  and  nine  groups,  in  model  (3-­‐‑4)  and  (5-­‐‑6),  respectively.  
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The two control variables have also a significant impact on the network performance. 
Logically, a positive relationship is highlighted between ABF labeled chains and performance. 
The headquarter nationality (Brazilian versus no-Brazilian) has also an effect on the chain 
performance. The negative sign indicates here that chains with Brazilian headquarters are more 
likely to achieve higher performances. 
As the location strategy variable sums up several strategic decisions of the franchised chain, we 
estimate additional models including as regressors the variables initially used in the clustering. 
The aim is to go further in the comments, based on complementary results. The full estimation 
results of these models (models 7-10) are presented in Appendix 3. We provide a summary of 
these results in Table 4. 
Here again we obtain a good global significance of the estimated models, and the results are 
robust. The significant and negative sign of the variable Network geographic dispersion provides 
support to the preceding empirical results, indicating that agglomeration favors chain 
performance. 
These estimation results provide additional evidence. 
First, the location in shopping center impacts significantly and positively chain performance. 
Multiplicative variables have no significant impact, suggesting that the interaction of dispersion 
with the network age or with the proportion of company-owned units does not affect the performance. 
Consistent with the gravity models, location in area with a high HDI, or a high population, 
increases chain performance. We obtain a reverse and surprising sign with the GDP (model 7). 
Concerning the control variables, the sign regarding the variable foreign is consistent with 
preceding results; the network age and the brand value favor the chain performance, which stands 
to reason. 
Table 3 – Performance outcome of spatial strategies (2) Summary of additional estimation results 
Random-effects models for the average monthly income / outlet 
Mean HDI of the network location area + *** 
Mean population of the network location area + *** 
% of network outlets in shopping malls + *** 
Network geographic dispersion _ *** 
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Conclusion 
 
The literature in economics and management underlines the role of location choice as one of 
the most important decision regarding retailing. Indeed, location is paramount as it defines the 
access and attraction of large numbers of customers, impacting thus the chain market-share and 
profitability. 
Studying Brazilian franchising, we focus on spatial strategies of franchising chains in this 
continental sized emerging country.  
In order to highlight the potential determinants of location choices, we first survey previous 
literature related to location decision and spatial competition between the franchisees of a same 
chain. 
Our analytical framework takes into account the complexity of store location problems, and 
the different factors potentially relevant. Four determinants of the location strategy are 
distinguished: the choice for agglomeration of the chain outlets versus dispersion in the space, the 
choice for a specific region or city, related to the socioeconomic features of the area, the choice 
for a preemption strategy to get a first mover advantage, related to the network age, and the 
location choice related to the ownership strategy of the chain. 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a new, recent, and unique panel dataset compiling 
information from three complementary sources, and containing geographical data, for the 
Brazilian case. With a two-step cluster analysis, we compile information related to location 
decisions to distinguish several spatial strategies of franchising chains in Brazil. These strategies 
are then submitted to econometric estimations in order to derive performance outcomes.  
Our results show that the choice for agglomeration leads to higher chain performances, which 
is consistent with the Hoteling’s model prediction. In addition, our estimation results provide 
evidence for the gravity model, as the chains located in area with high population and human 
development index reach higher performances. 
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Appendix 1. Brazilian franchising around the country 
Source: Brazilian Franchising Association (2015) 
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Appendix 2.  Summary of clustering analyzes 
 
Variables Clustering 1 
(Main clustering) 
Clustering 2 
(Control clustering) 
Clustering 3 
(Control clustering) 
Dispersion 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Mean population of the 
network location areas 
 
No No Yes 
Percentage of network 
outlets in shopping malls 
 
Yes No Yes 
Mean HDI of the network 
location areas 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Network age 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage of company 
owned-unit 
 
Yes No Yes 
Brand value Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Number of clusters 
& franchising chains 
Clusters Chains Clusters Chains Clusters Chains 
1 1020 1 229 1 176 
2 852 2 388 2 155 
3 138 3 506 3 229 
  4 412 4 318 
  5 251 5 371 
  6 200 6 397 
  7 24 7 151 
    8 175 
    9 38 
Quality of the clustering  
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Appendix 3.  Additional results for the performance outcome of spatial strategies 
 
Random effects models for the average monthly income per outlet 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     
Network Geo Dispersion -0.321* -0. 450* -0. 141* -0. 078** 
 (0.269) (0. 277) (0.0846) (0.00349) 
     
% of network outlets in 
shopping malls 
8.096*** 7.634***   
 (2.296) (1.955)   
Dispersion x Age   -0.0170  
   (0. 221)  
Dispersion x Owned units    0.194 
(0. 124) 
     
% of company-owned units    -2.075 
    (1.742) 
Mean GDP of the network 
location areas 
-0. 276*** 
(0.00492) 
   
     
Mean HDI of the network 
location areas 
 241.2*** 
(39.79) 
190.6*** 
(36.00) 
175.8*** 
(49.76) 
     
Mean population of the 
network location areas 
0. 139*** 
(0.0210) 
0.0172*** 
(0.00301) 
0.0259*** 
(0.00304) 
0.0268*** 
(0.00451) 
     
Network age 0.448*** 0.465*** 0.406*** 0.443*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0517) (0.0471) (0.0461) 
     
Brand value 0.563** 0.645** 0.279 0.519** 
 (0.238) (0.215) (0.232) (0.236) 
     
Foreign -26.24*** -28.63*** -24.63*** -26.50*** 
 (4.196) (4.319) (3.776) (4.107) 
     
Sector dummies 
 
yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Constant 48.43*** -127.9*** 81.59*** 83.73*** 
 (3.631) (31.44) (1.051) (0.925) 
     
Number of networks 335 335 335 335 
Wald chi2 712.49*** 877.87*** 790.55*** 996.18*** 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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4 Regarding the two variables “Foreign” and “ABF label”, the instrumental variables methodology cannot be used. 
Indeed, our dataset does not provide relevant instruments for these two variables. However, removing them from 
the models (step-by-step approach), we observe that the estimation results remain qualitatively similar. For this 
reason, we conclude that there is no endogeneity problem with these variables. 
 
5 We perform Hausman tests to compare the random effects model with a model including instrumental variables for 
the suspected endogenous variables.  
 
Appendix 4.  Specification tests 
(Econometric models 1-10) 
 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Hausman test 
χ2 
(p-value) 
1.44 
0.487 
9.81 
0.1995 
0.23 
0.998 
11.55 
0.1164 
0.76 
0.685 
1.02 
0.599 
7.19 
0.3033 
0.00 
0.9467 
0.01 
0.9306 
0.01 
0.9308 
Lagrange multiplier test 
χ2 
(p-value) 
3228.64 
0.000 
3149.50 
0.000 
3227.81 
0.000 
3137.45 
0.000 
3221.05 
0.000 
3127.55 
0.000 
3182.14 
0.000 
3172.48 
0.000 
3006.71 
0.000 
3189.98 
0.000 
Likelihood-ratio test for heteroskedasticity 
χ2 
(p-value) 
3307.8 
0.000 
4787.50 
0.000 
3307.85 
0.000 
4781.52 
0.000 
438.44 
0.000 
3536.06 
0.000 
3707 
0.000 
3724.46 
0.000 
4686.16 
0.000 
4786.44 
0.000 
Autocorrelation test 
χ2 
(p-value) 
13.23 
0.000 
13.231 
0.000 
13.052 
0.000 
13.056 
0.000 
13.25 
0.000 
13.251 
0.000 
11.531 
0.000 
11.530 
0.000 
12.844 
0.000 
11.633 
0.000 
Test to include fixed effects 
Year dummies 215.11 
0.000 
158.74 
0.000 
223.50 
0.000 
213.37 
0.000 
224.04 
0.000 
207.26 
0.000 
110.22 
0.000 
88.78 
0.000 
144.66 
0.000 
85.15 
0.000 
Sector dummies 606.22 
0.000 
763.24 
0.000 
493.58 
0.000 
620.25 
0.000 
532.31 
0.000 
668.14 
0.000 
217.85 
0.000 
169.38 
0.000 
450.31 
0.000 
344.88 
0.000 
Tested variable4                                              Test for Endogenity (Hausman test)5 
Location 
Strategy 
 
0.33 
1.00 
0.32 
1.00 
3.11 
0.9597 
4.15 
0.9652 
4.09 
0.943 
3.40 
0.992 
    
Dispersion       0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
% of company-owned units          
Network age       0.21 
1.00 
0.21 
1.00 
 0.00 
1.00 
Dispersion x Owned units        0.00  
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1.00 
Dispersion x Age         0.00 
1.00 
% of network outlets in shopping centre   0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
  
Mean GDP of the network location areas    1.51 
1.00 
  
Mean population of the network location areas    0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
Mean HDI of the network location areas   0.00 
1.00 
 0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
Brand value      6.73 
0.965 
0.02 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
